State of Utah v. Clifton Yazzie : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
State of Utah v. Clifton Yazzie : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General.
William L. Schultz; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Yazzie, No. 20040285 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4895
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CLIFTON YAZZIE, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) Case #20040285-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, HONORABLE LYLE ANDERSON PRESIDING 
O0o 
William L. Schultz, Bar # 3626 
69 East Center 
P.O. Box 937 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Attorney for Appellant 
J. Frederick Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 13 m 
ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v
« ; 
CLIFTON YAZZIE, J 
Defendant. ] 
} Case #20040285-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, HONORABLE LYLE ANDERSON PRESIDING 
0O0 
William L. Schultz, Bar # 3626 
69 East Center 
P.O. Box 937 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Attorney for Appellant 
J. Frederick Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
A. Facts Available to Halliday Prior to the Seizure 4 
B. Facts Occurring After the Seizure 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 10 
HALLIDAY'S SUSPICION WAS NOT REASONABLE 10 
A. The Fourth Amendment and Reasonable 
Suspicion 10 
B. The Facts and Circumstances of the Case . .13 
C. The Facts Do Not Support the Finding That 
Yazzie Had Not Had a License for a Long 
Time 15 
D. The Facts Do Not Support a Reasonable 
Articulable Suspicion 17 
(1) An Individual of Reasonable Caution Would 
Believe the Actions Taken Bv Halliday 
Were Unreasonable 18 
(2) The Suspended Utah License is Evidence 
Discovered After the Stop and Cannot Be 
Considered in a Reasonable Suspicion 
Analysis 21 
(3) Reliance Upon Mistaken Information Does 
Not Support a Reasonable Suspicion . . 22 
CONCLUSION 24 
ADDENDUM 
A. Judgment and Order of Commitment to Utah State 
Prison, dated March 30, 2004. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Caselaw• 
Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 
18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) 18 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 
59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) 10,18 
State v. Baird, 763 P.3d 1214 (Utah App. 1988) 21 
State v. Bello, 871 P.3d 584 (Utah App. 1994) . . .13 
State v. Bisseaaer, 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178 9,11 
State v. Case, 884 P.3d 1274 (Utah App. 1994) 13 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650 9,11 
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995) 18 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) 12,17,18,21,22 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) . 2,9,13 
State v. Serv, 758 P.3d 935 (Utah 1988) 3 
State v. Tetmver, 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1997 I 13 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) 2 
Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(U.S. Ohio 1968) 11,12,13,18,21 
U.S. v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537 (10th Cir. 1994) . . 18,19,20 
U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 
104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) 13 
Rules, Statutes and Constitutions; 
ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, § 2 8 - 1 8 5 2 7 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMEND. IV . . . . 2 , 8 , 1 0 , 1 1 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 5 3 - 3 - 6 0 4 7 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 8 - 2 a - 3 (2) (e) . • 1 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, A r t . 1 § 14 . . 8 , 1 0 
Other 
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §5.1(h) . 18 
ii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v
« ; 
CLIFTON YAZZIE, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) Case #20040285-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Judgment and Order of 
Commitment to Utah State Prison, dated March 30, 2004 (the 
^Judgment"), of the Seventh Judicial District Court involving 
criminal convictions for Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol with priors, a Third Degree Felony; No Insurance on 
Motor Vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Driving on Suspended 
or Revoked Operator's License, a Class C Misdemeanor. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78-2a-3 (2)(e). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's 
motion to suppress by finding that Chief Halliday had a 
reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant? 
Standard of Review: The factual findings underlying the 
trial court's decision with respect to a motion to suppress 
the evidence are reviewed under the deferential "clearly 
erroneous" standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 n. 4 
(Utah 1994) accord State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1272 (Utah 
1993). Furthermore, the "determination of whether a specific 
set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a 
determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for 
correctness." Pena, at 939; Thurman, at 1272. "The 
reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one that conveys a 
measure of discretion to the trial judge when applying that 
standard to a given set of facts. Precisely how much 
discretion we cannot say...." Pena, at 939. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMEND. IV 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. 1 § 14 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 17, 2003, Clifton Yazzie (hereinafter 
"Xazzie") was charged by Information with Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol with priors, a Third Degree Felony; No 
Insurance on Motor Vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Driving 
2 
on Suspended or Revoked Operator's License, a Class C 
Misdemeanor. R001-R003. On December 15, 2003, the matter came 
for a preliminary hearing before Honorable Lyle R. Anderson of 
the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan 
County, State of Utah. R057. The trial court bound Yazzie 
over on all three charges. Id. at p. 16. 
On February 12, 2004, Yazzie filed his Motion to Suppress 
and Request for Hearing (the "Motion") requesting that the 
trial court suppress the evidence taken or statements made 
subsequent to the illegal stop and illegal search of Yazzie's 
car (R018-R019). On February 17, 2004, the matter came for 
hearing on the Motion, at which time the trial court denied 
the Motion (R058) . Based upon the denial of the Motion, 
Yazzie entered a conditional guilty plea to all three charges, 
specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of the 
Motion under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). Id. at pp. 31-34. 
On March 29, 2004, Yazzie came for sentencing before the 
trial court (R059). On that date, the trial court ordered 
Yazzie to be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for a term 
not to exceed five years, and in the San Juan County Jail for 
six (6) months and 90 days to be served concurrently with the 
3 
prison sentence. R059 at p. 7. On March 30, 2004, the trial 
court entered the Judgment. R04 6-R050. 
On April 7, 2004, Yazzie filed his Notice of Appeal from 
the Judgment. On April 27, 2004, Yazzie filed his Docketing 
Statement challenging the trial court's denial of the Motion 
and questioning whether there was sufficient basis for 
Halliday to stop Yazzie and his vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Facts Available to Halliday Prior to the Seizure. 
Chief Halliday (hereinafter "Halliday") of the Blanding 
City Police Department has known Yazzie through law 
enforcement for more than twenty (20) years and has had 
several prior non-traffic, but alcohol-related encounters with 
Yazzie—i.e. public intoxication, disorderly conduct, etc. 
R058 at pp. 6, 8, 15. Although none of Halliday's prior 
encounters with Yazzie were traffic related, as typical 
procedure Halliday requested identification from Yazzie during 
more than ten (10) of these prior encounters. Id. at pp. 7 
and 16. Halliday himself, however, does not recall if he has 
ever specifically requested a driver's license from Yazzie. 
Id. at p. 17. Halliday claims Yazzie never produced a 
4 
driver's license as identification during these encounters, 
even though he did have one. Id. 
At the time of the incident at issue herein, Halliday had 
not had any type of encounter with Yazzie for more than one 
year and had never had a traffic incident involving Yazzie. 
R058 at pp. 15, 16. Halliday himself stated that he had no 
reason to believe that Yazzie had not obtained a driver's 
license since he had last seen him, and that he was not aware 
of any reason that would preclude Yazzie from doing so. Id. 
at p. 18. 
The incident at issue in this appeal occurred on October 
15, 2003, when Halliday observed Yazzie driving a vehicle. 
Halliday followed Yazzie for four (4) blocks before pulling 
him over and did not observe any traffic violations. R058 at 
p. 8. Because Halliday had never conducted an official inquiry 
into the matter, he mistakenly believed that Yazzie had never 
obtained a Utah driver's license (a) because Yazzie had never 
produced one during the prior non-traffic related encounters 
and (b) because he had never seen Yazzie driving. Id. at pp. 
13, 15. Halliday stated that, upon seeing Yazzie driving, he 
would have "bet anything [Yazzie] had no license" and "would 
have gave odds." Id. at p. 7. Halliday also indicated that 
5 
he "would have given odds on the fact that [Yazzie] was 
drinkin'" although Yazzie did not commit any traffic 
violations observed by Halliday and there were no other 
indications that Yazzie had been drinking. Id. at pp. 8, 9. 
Upon observing Yazzie driving a vehicle, Halliday did not 
attempt to contact dispatch to affirm or dispel his mistaken 
belief because, in these circumstances where he believed a 
driver had no license, his standard practice was to stop a 
person and check rather than call dispatch. Id. at p. 13. 
B. Facts Occurring After the Seizure. 
During the incident at issue in this appeal, Halliday 
decided to pull Yazzie over after following Yazzie for 
approximately four (4) blocks, not because he had observed any 
traffic violations, but because he believed Yazzie was driving 
without a license. R058 at pp. 8, 12, 13. When Halliday 
approached Yazzie and requested his driver's license, Yazzie 
produced an Arizona driver's license, which turned out to be 
valid when checked through dispatch. Id. at pp. 8, 19/ R057 
at p. 7. Halliday was aware that Arizona was an interstate 
6 
driving compact state1, but he did not let Yazzie go after 
confirming the validity of the Arizona license. Id. at p. 19. 
Halliday believed Yazzie was a resident of White Mesa2, 
because he had been to Yazzie's house, Yazzie had given that 
as his address in investigations, and Yazzie had never 
indicated to Halliday that he lived in another state. R058 at 
pp. 10, 11, 12. Halliday, however, did not inquire as to why 
Yazzie had an Arizona license, even though he was aware that 
some Native Americans live on both sides of the state line. 
Id. at p. 11, 20. 
Halliday testified that he did not inquire as to why 
Yazzie had an Arizona license because Halliday detected 
alcohol on Yazzie and was more concerned with Yazzie's 
possible impairment. Id. at pp. 8, 20. Upon detecting 
alcohol, Halliday called Officer Mike Bradford ("Bradford") to 
assist. R057 at p. 6. On his way to assist and without any 
direction from Halliday, Bradford called dispatch again and 
1
 The Drivers' License Compact (the "Compact") is 
codified under UTAH CODE ANN. §53-3-604. Pursuant to Title 
28, Chapter 6, Article 3 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, 
Arizona adopted the Compact, specifically codified at §28-
1852. 
2
 White Mesa is located in the four corners area 
within the boundaries of Utah. 
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had them check Yazzie for a driver's license in Utah and the 
four corner states. Id. at pp. 6-7, 9-10. Dispatch informed 
the officers that Yazzie had a suspended license in Utah. Id. 
at p. 8; R058 at p. 8. 
Although as he approached he did not smell alcohol on 
Yazzie, on direction from Halliday, Bradford performed field 
sobriety tests on Yazzie and Yazzie did not pass them. R058 at 
p. 8; R057 at p. 7. Bradford then performed a breathalyzer 
and the result was .222. R058 at p. 8. After the incident, 
upon pulling Yazzie's criminal history, it was determined that 
his license was suspended for two (2) prior DUIs3 of which 
Halliday was unaware at the time of the incident. Id. at p. 
15. Yazzie was charged with Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol with priors, a Third Degree Felony; No Insurance on 
Motor Vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Driving on Suspended 
or Revoked Operator's License, a Class C Misdemeanor. R001-
R003. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution both 
3
 The Information lists the dates for the priors as 
September 5, 1995, and July 3, 2001 (R0001). 
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guarantee the "right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." "An unreasonable traffic stop is an 
unconstitutional seizure.'' State v. Bisseqger, 2003 UT App 
256, 76 P.3d 178; State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1 28, 63 P.3d 
650. A stop is constitutionally justified if the officer has 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant has been, 
is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. See, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-7-15; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 
1994). This Court determines whether sufficient specific and 
articulable facts exist to establish reasonable suspicion by 
examining the totality of the facts and circumstances of the 
case. State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah App. 
1997)(citations omitted). 
The totality of the circumstances in this matter do not 
establish reasonable suspicion. Halliday relied solely upon 
Yazzie's prior non-traffic related encounters to mistakenly 
assume that Yazzie had never obtained a Utah driver's license. 
Halliday observed no other traffic violations prior to 
stopping Yazzie. The trial court then erroneously relied upon 
the after-acquired knowledge regarding Yazzie's suspended 
driver's license as support for Halliday's ''reasonable 
9 
suspicion'' prior to the stop. The circumstances in this 
matter do not support a reasonable suspicion for Halliday to 
have stopped Yazzie. The trial court's denial of the Motion 
should be reversed and the Judgment overturned in favor of 
protecting Yazzie's Fourth Amendment right "to be secure ... 
against unreasonable ... seizures." 
ARGUMENT 
HALLIDAY'S SUSPICION 
WAS NOT REASONABLE 
A. The Fourth Amendment and Reasonable Suspicion. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution both 
guarantee the "right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." The U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
"stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitute[s] a seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and 
the resulting detention quite brief.,f Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court in recent years have 
both previously held that *[a]n unreasonable traffic stop is 
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an unconstitutional seizure." State v. Bisseaaer, 2003 UT App 
256, 76 P.3d 178; State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1 28, 63 P.3d 
650, 
The long-standing authority by which it is determined 
whether a traffic stop is reasonable was conceived by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (U.S.Ohio 1968). In Terry, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held as follows: 
In justifying particular intrusion, police officer 
must be able to point to specific and articulable 
facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusions-
facts must be judged against objective standard of 
whether facts available to officer at moment of 
seizure or search would warrant man of reasonable 
caution in belief that action taken was appropriate. 
392 U.S. at 21; 88 S.Ct. at 1880. The U.S. Supreme Court 
noted that "[t]his demand for specificity in the information 
upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching 
of [its] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at fn. 18 
(citations omitted) . The U.S. Supreme Court went on to 
explain as follows: 
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes 
meaningful only when it is assured that at some 
point the conduct of those charged with enforcing 
the laws can be subjected to the more detached, 
neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the 
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in 
light of the particular circumstances. 
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Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; 88 S.Ct. at 1880. "And in making that 
assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against 
[the] objective standard..." as set forth in Terry. Id.; 392 
U.S. at 21-22; 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (citations omitted). The U.S. 
Supreme Court explained further that "[a]nything less would 
invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights 
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, 
a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction." 
Id.; 392 U.S. at 22; 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (citations omitted). 
To determine whether a search or seizure is 
constitutionally reasonable, the Utah Supreme Court has 
adopted a dual inquiry from Terry: (1) Was the police 
officer's action justified at its inception? and (2) Was the 
resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place? State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994) 
citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20; 88 S.Ct. at 1879. Appellant 
challenges only the constitutionality of the initial stop on 
appeal in the instant matter so an analysis of the second 
portion of the dual inquiry is unnecessary. See, State v. 
Tetmver, 947 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah App. 1997). 
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A stop is constitutionally justified if the officer has 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant has been, 
is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. See, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-7-15; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 
1994). Therefore, the issue herein is whether, based on the 
facts of the case, Halliday's initial stop of Yazzie was 
supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. This Court 
determines whether sufficient specific and articulable facts 
exist to establish reasonable suspicion by examining the 
totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. State v. 
Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah App. 1997), citing State 
v- Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Terry, 
392 U.S. at 21; 88 S.Ct. at 1880; U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 
7-8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); accord S_£ate 
v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1994)). 
B. The Facts and Circumstances of the Case. 
Halliday has known Yazzie through law enforcement for 
more than twenty (20) years and has had several prior non-
traffic, but alcohol-related encounters with Yazzie—i.e. 
public intoxication, disorderly conduct, etc. (R058 at pp. 6, 
8, 15). Although none of Halliday's prior encounters with 
Yazzie were traffic related, as typical procedure Halliday 
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requested identification from Yazzie during more than ten (10) 
of these prior encounters. Id. at pp. 7 and 16. Halliday 
himself, however, does not recall if he has ever specifically 
requested a driver's license from Yazzie. Id. at p. 17. 
Halliday claims Yazzie never produced a driver's license as 
identification during these encounters, even though he did 
have one. Id. 
At the time of the incident at issue herein, Halliday had 
not had any type of encounter with Yazzie for more than one 
year and had never been involved with a traffic incident 
pertaining to Yazzie (R058 at pp. 15, 16). Halliday himself 
stated that he had no reason to believe that Yazzie had not 
obtained a driver's license since he had last seen him, and 
that he was not aware of any reason that would preclude Yazzie 
from doing so. Id. at p. 18. 
On October 15, 2003, Halliday observed Yazzie driving a 
vehicle. Because Halliday had never conducted an official 
inquiry into the matter, he mistakenly believed that Yazzie 
had never obtained a Utah driver's license. Specifically, 
Halliday's misguided assumption was based on the fact that (a) 
Yazzie had never produced a Utah driver's license during the 
prior non-traffic related encounters and (b) Halliday had 
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never seen Yazzie driving (R058 at pp. 13, 15) . Halliday 
stated that, upon seeing Yazzie driving, he would have "bet 
anything [Yazzie] had no license" and "would have gave odds." 
Id. at p. 7. 
Upon observing Yazzie driving a vehicle, Halliday did not 
attempt to contact dispatch to affirm or dispel his mistaken 
belief. In these circumstances where he believed a driver had 
no license, his standard practice was to stop a person and 
check rather than call dispatch. Id. at p. 13. 
C. The Facts Do Not Support the Finding That Yazzie Had 
Not Had a License for a Long Time. 
Based upon the facts articulated above, the trial court 
found that Halliday had a reasonable suspicion requisite to 
stop Yazzie (R058 at pp. 29) . The findings of the trial court 
in this matter were only articulated orally and are as 
follows: 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Well, the reason why I wished the officer had 
checked, ah, or watched, until he committed a 
traffic violation, as he probably would have, is 
that, ah, I'm gonna deny the motion to suppress. 
But I think it could be appealed, and I'd just as 
soon not have this added to my roster of reversals, 
Court of Appeals. Because I think there's an issue 
here. It's not a no-brainer. It could have been 
one, and it isn't. 
Ah, the reason that I think that it was 
reasonable for the officer to stop is that it was 
such a long time that the defendant had never had a 
15 
license. I think it's reasonable to — to believe 
he still doesn't have one, and he's driving now. 
But there's a fairly strong argument the other 
way. You know, maybe he decided to go get a 
license, before he started drivin'. And in fact, he 
did. In this case it turned out he did. He got it 
from the wrong agency. It didn't do him any good. 
It was both wrong, because he wasn't a resident of 
Arizona, and because his license was — an even if 
it was a valid Arizona license, it was useless in 
Utah, because his privilege to drive in Utah was 
suspended. But he had — he had apparently decided 
he wanted to try to get a license. 
But I think it was reasonable for the officer to 
suspect that he did not have a license, that he was 
driving based on that long history and the frequent 
contact. 
This is an unusual case. I wouldn't ordinarily 
permit an officer to stop someone just because once 
before, somebody didn't have a license. But because 
of the number of times and the extended period of 
time, I think it was reasonable for just him just to 
assume that yeah, he still didn't have a license. 
So I'm denying the motion to suppress. 
Id. at pp. 28-29. 
The trial court found that it was reasonable for Halliday 
to stop Yazzie because "...it was such a long time that the 
defendant had never had a license." (R058 at p. 28). This 
finding is simply not supported by the testimony offered by 
Halliday4. As testimony reveals, Halliday was under the 
mistaken assumption when he pulled Yazzie over that Yazzie had 
4
 Halliday was the only witness on either side to 
provide testimony at the hearing on the Motion (R058 at p. 
16 
never obtained a license5. Bradford and Halliday both 
testified at the preliminary hearing and the hearing on the 
Motion, respectively, that dispatch informed them that Yazzie 
had obtained a Utah license (R057 at p. 8; R058 at p. 8) . The 
State never offered any evidence as to when Yazzie obtained a 
Utah license, and Halliday was personally unaware of any of 
Yazzie's history regarding possible traffic violations (R058 
at p. 14)• 
This finding is erroneously based on Halliday's mistaken 
assumption that Yazzie never had a license. Halliday had no 
personal knowledge of such information and testified that he 
discovered later that he was incorrect in his assumption. The 
trial court erred in relying upon this misinformation, and 
erroneously concluded that Halliday had the reasonable 
suspicion requisite to a constitutional stop. 
D. The Facts Do Not Support a Reasonable Articulable 
Suspicion. 
There is "no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against 
the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." State v. 
5
 Halliday did not believe that Yazzie had a suspended 
or revoked license when he pulled him over. Halliday simply 
believed that Yazzie had never obtained a Utah license (R058 
at p. 13). 
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Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (alterations in 
original) {quoting Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 
1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1734, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 
(1967)); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
5.1(h), at 435-36 (1987). In other words, "the permissibility 
of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by 
balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests." State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah,1995) citing 
Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 
L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). 
(1) An Individual of Reasonable Caution Would 
Believe the Actions Taken Bv Hallidav Were 
Inappropriate. 
Facts surrounding a seizure "...must be judged against 
objective standard of whether facts available to officer at 
moment of seizure or search would warrant man of reasonable 
caution in belief that action taken was appropriate." Terry, 
392 U.S. at 21; 88 S.Ct. at 1880. " [KJnowledge of a person's 
prior criminal involvement ... is alone insufficient to give 
rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion." United States v. 
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Sandoval. 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir.1994). The 10th Circuit 
Court of Appeals explained as follows: 
If the law were otherwise, any person with any sort 
of criminal record—or even worse, a person with 
arrests but no convictions—could be subjected to a 
Terry-type investigation stop by a law enforcement 
officer at any time without the need for any other 
justification at all. Any such rule would clearly 
run counter to the requirement of a reasonable 
suspicion, and of the need that such stops be 
justified in light of a balancing of the competing 
interests at stake.... 
Sandoval. 29 F.3d at 543. To allow Halliday's stop of Yazzie 
to be considered constitutional would run contrary to the 
requirement of a reasonable suspicion. 
Halliday knew Yazzie through non-traffic related 
encounters. Halliday had asked Yazzie for identification 
during these encounters, but not specifically a driver's 
license. Since Yazzie did not produce a Utah driver's 
license, Halliday at some point incorrectly assumed that 
Yazzie had never obtained one, even though Yazzie had never 
indicated as such and had actually obtained one. 
More than a year passed in which Halliday did not 
encounter Yazzie or ask for his identification. Then on 
October 15, 2003, Halliday observed Yazzie driving, at which 
point Halliday mistakenly believed his unchecked and outdated 
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assumption to be true to the extent that he did not even radio 
dispatch to affirm or dispel his assumption before pulling 
Yazzie over. 
To allow these facts to articulate the requisite 
reasonable suspicion would run contrary to reasonableness 
itself. For instance, an individual who provides an alternate 
form of identification to police would be assumed to not have 
a driver's license and, even a year after the encounter, could 
be pulled over on suspicion of driving without a license. 
Another example would be an individual who is cited for 
driving without a license is pulled over even more than a year 
later based solely on the assumption that they must not have 
obtained a license during that year. Neither of these 
circumstances are "reasonable" and are obviously intrusive of 
the individual's Fourth Amendment rights, as is the instant 
case. 
Hence the reasoning behind the 10th Circuit's 
determination that prior criminal involvement alone is 
insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion. Sandoval 
at 542. Halliday based his suspicion on his prior involvement 
with Yazzie and the fact that Yazzie never provided him with 
a Utah driver's license as identification. Just because he 
never provided Halliday with one did not automatically mean he 
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did not have one, and surely did not rise to justify pulling 
Yazzie over if he ever saw him driving a vehicle. Halliday 
intruded upon Yazzie's constitutionally guaranteed rights 
based on nothing more substantial than an inarticulate hunch. 
See, Terry, 392 U.S. at 22; 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (citations 
omitted). 
(2) The Suspended Utah License is Evidence 
Discovered After the Stop and Cannot Be 
Considered in a Reasonable Suspicion Analysis. 
Reasonable suspicion determinations turn on the facts 
known to the officer at the time of the stop. Lopez at 1138, 
fn. 6 (emphasis added). Evidence discovered after the stop 
cannot be considered. Id.; see, State v. Baird, 7 63 P.2d 
1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988) . In Lopez, this Court stated that 
"if the trial court finds no traffic violation, then the stop 
is not justified at its inception and is therefore 
unconstitutional." Lopez at 1139. 
Prior to the stop, Halliday believed Yazzie did not have 
a Utah driver's license. Not until after a thorough check 
with dispatch was it determined that Yazzie's driver's license 
in Utah was suspended. The fact that Yazzie's license was 
suspended in Utah was evidence discovered after the stop and 
cannot be considered in the analysis of whether Halliday had 
a reasonable suspicion. Lopez at 1138. 
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However, the trial court did erroneously consider the 
suspension of Yazzie's Utah driver's license in determining 
whether Halliday had a reasonable suspicion to stop Yazzie. 
The trial court stated in its findings that Yazzie had 
attempted to get a license, but "...even if it was a valid 
Arizona license, it was useless in Utah, because his privilege 
to drive in Utah was suspended." (R058 at pp. 28-29). 
Halliday did not have this information available to him to 
form the requisite reasonable suspicion. 
Driving without a Utah license was the alleged violation 
in support of Halliday's reasonable suspicion to pull Yazzie 
over. However, the State did not charge Yazzie with this 
violation, hence the trial court did not have the opportunity 
to address it. Since Yazzie was not charged with this 
violation, there were no means of finding that he committed 
it. Thus, the stop was not justified at its inception and the 
seizure was unconstitutional. Lopez at 1139. 
(3) Reliance Upon Mistaken Information Does Not 
Support a Reasonable Suspicion. 
In State v. Lopez, Officer Hamner testified that while he 
was working as an undercover narcotics officer, Lopez was 
TTpointed out" to him as Jose Cruz, a known drug dealer. 873 
P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1994). A computer check on Jose Cruz 
showed no driver's license. Id. Officer Hamner pulled Lopez 
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over based on the erroneous information that he was Jose Cruz 
driving without a license. Id. at 1131. Lopez had never 
represented himself to Officer Hamner as being named or going 
by the name of Jose Cruz. Id. The Supreme Court of Utah 
determined that it was reasonable to assume from these facts 
that "...the trial court found no reasonable suspicion to stop 
Lopez for driving without a license." Id. 
Similarly here, Halliday relied upon erroneous 
information pertaining to Yazzie to effectuate the stop at 
issue. Halliday pulled Yazzie over on the mistaken assumption 
that he had never obtained a Utah driver's license. It was 
later found that Yazzie had obtained a Utah driver's license. 
Halliday did not testify that Yazzie ever indicated that he 
did not have a Utah driver's license, only that he didn't 
produce one in non-traffic encounters. It is reasonable for 
this Court to assume from these facts that Halliday relied 
upon an erroneous assumption and, accordingly, there was no 
reasonable suspicion for Halliday to pull Yazzie over in his 
vehicle. 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's Judgment and order such other relief as it deems 
necessary. 
DATED this 9th day of September, 2004. 
William L. Schultz 
Counsel for Appellant 
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Judgment and Order of 
Commitment to Utah State Prison, 
dated March 30, 2004 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLIFTON YAZZIE 
DOB: 01/29/1961, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
OF COMMITMENT TO 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Case No. 0317-98 
Case Judge: Lyle R. Anderson 
MARCH 29, 2004 
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
Plaintiff Attorney: Craig C. Halls 
Defendant Attorney: William L. Schultz 
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing judgment in this case, and the 
defendant being present in Court and represented by counsel, and defendant having heretofore 
entered a plea of guilty to the offenses of: 
COUNT 1: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, a Third 
Degree Felony; COUNT 2: NO INSURANCE ON MOTOR VEHICLE, a Class B Misdemeanor; 
and COUNT 3: DRIVING ON SUSPENDED OR REVOKED OPERATOR'S LICENSE, a 
Class C Misdemeanor; and no legal reason having been shown why judgment of this Court 
should not be pronounced, it is the judgment and sentence of this court as follows, to wit: that the 
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defendant, CLIFTON YAZZIB, be imprisoned in the UTAII STATB PRISON for a term not *> 
exceed RVE (5) YEARS on Count 1, SIX (6) MONTHS on Count 2 and NINETY (90) DAYS 
on Count 3, to be served concurrently. 
Defendant is also ordered to pay $250 restitution to San Joan County for the Public 
Defender's Fund. 
Defendant JS hereby remanded iv the custody of tfce San Juan County Sheriff or other 
proper officer to be transported to tfie Utah State Prison. 
DATED this 3$U 4** of March, 2004. 
Sistrict Court Judge 
sr-r^ Craig C. Hall* 
San Juan County Attorney 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY Hurt on the i f i l _ day of March. 2004,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and corwet copy of the fbregning JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT to 
William L. Sehiliz. Attorney for defendant, PO Box 937, Moab, UT 84532; Adult Probation 
Department &tU6S South Highway 191 #3, Moab, UT 84532; and to the Department of 
Corrections, P.O. Box 250, Draper, UT 8402O. 
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defendant, CLIFTON YAZZIE, be imprisoned in the UTAH STATE PRISON for a term not to 
exceed FIVE (5) YEARS on Count 1, SDC (6) MONTHS on Count 2 and NINETY (90) DAYS 
on Count 3, to be served concurrently. 
Defendant is also ordered to pay $250 restitution to San Juan County for the Public 
Defender's Fund. 
Defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the San Juan County Sheriff or other 
proper officer to be transported to the Utah State Prison. 
DATED this day of March, 2004. 
£^i?0%?2$L. 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
Lyle R. Anderson 
District Court Judge 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of March, 2004,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT to 
William L. Schultz, Attorney for defendant, PO Box 937, Moab, UT 84532; Adult Probation 
Department at 1165 South Highway 191 #3, Moab, UT 84532; and to the Department of 
Corrections, P.O. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020. 
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defendant, CLIFTON YAZZIE, be imprisoned in the UTAII STATE PRISON for a term not *> 
exceed HVE (5) YEARS on Cotmt 1, SIX (6) MONTHS on Count 2 and MNJBTY (90) DAYS 
on Count 3, to be served concurrently. 
Defendant is also ordered to pay $250 restitution to San Juan County for the Public 
Dcfcudcr'sFund. 
Defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the Saa Juan County Sheriff or other 
proper officer to be transported to the Utah State Prison. 
DATED this y/jU day of Match. 2004. 
J^n^Afiaerson 
^District w Court Judge 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
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